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The very fact that I have been asked to participate in a program of thi s significa nce is indicative
of an ever in creasin g problem that is facing all face ts
of the medical profession-that is, how to stay in the
hospital and out of the courtroom. I shall be talking
about some of the general considerations all of you,
as anesthe sio logists, anesth eti sts. and ph ys icians,
should keep in mind in o rder to und ersta nd your
legal responsibilities to the patient.
The topic ·' Rece nt Develo pments" is partially
a mi snomer because what I am go ing to address
myself to is the recent trends o r developments in
three particul a r areas of the law as it affects the
field of medicine, and th en atte mpt to relate these
particularl y to the field of a nesthesiology. Y o u mu st
also understand that "recent" medic ally and " rece nt"
legally may in fact be years apart. What are commonly referred to as recent legal theo ries, freq ue ntl y
find their origin in court dec isions several decades
old. At the same tim e, some of wh a t follows is of
such recent vintage as to be classified by a vintner
as green.
First, I would lik e to disc uss the phys ici an's
duty to inform hi s patient and the recent legal developments in the area of inform ed consent. Second, I will di sc uss briefly the area of pote ntial
contract liab ility which is so mewhat rela ted to informed consent. And last, some of th e more class ical
legal problems involving a ph ysic ian and his patient ,
with special e mph as is o n the Captain of th e Ship
Doctrine and respondeat superior.
While the time has not yet ar ri ved, and hopefully never will , when a physicia n cannot go about
his daily tas ks without having a copy of Gray's
Anatomy in one hand plus Corpus Juris in th e o ther,
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educ ati o n as to the legal as pects of the practice of
med icine in rece nt yea rs has or should become a
required co urse of stud y in our natio n's medic al
schools a nd colleges. It is with thi s thou ght in mind
th at I prese nt to yo u today's di sc ussion.
Informed Consent. The D oct rine of Informed
Consen t is th e child of the Doctrine of the In violab ility of the Individual Body, a concept born of the
common law. Thus, it was stated in a rece nt case
th at " Anglo-American law sta rts with the premi se
of thoro ugh-go ing self-determin ati o n; each ma n is
considered to be maste r of hi s own body a nd he
may, if of so und mind, ex pressly prohibit the perfo rm a nce of life-savin g surgery, or other medical
t reatme nt , and while a doctor might well believe
th a t an o pe rat ion or a for m of treatm ent is desirable
or necessary, the law does not permit him to substitute hi s own judgment for th at of the patient by
any form of a rtifice or deception" (I) .
It is because of this deep-rooted concept th at,
prior to a ny trea tm ent , a ph ys ici an mu st obtain hi s
patient's conse nt. Valid consent to treatm ent can be
obtained in any of several ways. First, the physicia n
ca n obtain th e express consent of the patient. This
is done either ora lly o r in writing, and most hospitals
now have some type of consent form , though frequently inadequate. Second , consent may be implied
in fact. Implied in fact consent occ urs when a patient knowingly acce pts trea tm ent , as in rolling up
hi s sleeve fo r an inj ectio n or agrees to an examination by lying on th e exa mining table. Third, consent
may be implied in law. Such consent occurs when
the patient comes to a hospital unconscious or an
e mergency condition a rises whereby he is un ab le to
ackn owledge hi s consent to treat ment. Finally , conse nt may be given by a parent or guardi a n in the
case of a child or incompetent.
For various reasons, the consent given may be
a nullit y. For instance, the consent may ha ve been
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given by one who had no a utho rit y to give it, or it
may have been obta ined by fr aud o r mi srep rese ntati on on th e part of th e ph ys ician. Whil e mos t physicians are aware of th ese traditi onal reasons fo r
in validat ing a co nsent , a re lati ve ly new reaso n fo r
such has developed in rece nt yea rs. Thus, courts
have held with in creas ing frequ ency th at a pati ent 's
conse nt mu st be in fo rm ed and in te lli ge nt in orde r
to be va lid . Th e pati ent mu st have a clea r und erstanding of what procedu re is to be perfor med on
him and th e risks and poss ibl e co mpl ications in volved . A d isclosu re th at fa ll s short of thi s test ca n
in va lid ate th e conse nt give n just as thoroughly as
if it had been obt ained th rough fr aud.
Whil e acti ons at law have always bee n avail a bl e to pa ti ents aga inst th ei r phys icians fo r fr audu lentl y induced conse nt o r fo r operat ions pe rfo rm ed
witho ut conse nt , o nly rece ntl y have acti o ns at law
bee n maint ain ed by pati ents who all ege th at although
the ir co nsent was given, it was in va lid du e to the
ph ys ic ian's fa llin g short of his duty to in form . This
new ri ght of ac ti on a ppea rs to have its genesis in
th e dictum ' of a V irgini a case, H unter v. B urroughs
(2), dec ided in 19 18. In thi s case, th e pl aintiff was
suffering fr om ecze ma a nd th e defend ant/ ph ys ici a n
recomm ended x- ray trea tm ent as a cure. Back in
19 14 such a trea tm ent was revoluti ona ry, and th e
defend ant fa il ed to wa rn th e pl ai nti ff of th e ri sk of
poss ible burn in volved in its use. Th e pa tient suffe red se vere burns and sued hi s ph ys ician o n two
th eo ri es. Fi rst, he all eged th at th e trea tm ent had
bee n admin is tered negligently; and second. he a lleged th at th e phys ic ian fa il ed to wa rn him of th e
poss ibl e da nge rs o f x-ray trea tm ent. Th e co urt affi rm ed a judgment fo r th e pl a in tiff o n h is neglige nce
th eo ry and thu s did not have to reac h th e issue o f
in for med consent. H owever, in a d ictum, th e co urt
laid th e gro un d wo rk fo r later co urt decisions o n info rmed conse nt ( 3).
Th e bas is of such a n acti on is that a patient
ca nnot give a va lid conse nt to a treat ment whi ch h e
kn ows littl e o r nothin g abo ut. Th e invi olab ility of
the indi vid ua l body necess it ates th a t any conse nt
give n must be based on in fo rm ati on necessa ry to
make th e conse nt intellige nt a nd free ly given. This
in clud es th e dut y of th e ph ys ic ia n to d isc lose to hi s
pati ent all releva nt in for matio n conce rning a p rot Di ctum-a sta te me nt o f a principle of law in a deci sio n by a court whi c h was sugges ted by t he case but was
no t necessa ry fo r a dec isio n o f th e case as dec ided.

posed treat ment , includin g th e coll ateral ri sks and
co m plic ations atte nd ant to th e treatment , so that
th e pati ent's conse nt would be an intellige nt on e
based o n co mplete in fo rm ati on. Th e mod ern action
based on a lac k of info rm ed consent did not full y
deve lo p until 1960 in th e case of Natanson v. Kline
( 4), a case very simil ar fa ctu all y to th e Hu nter case.
In the Natanson case, M rs. Natanson had undergone surge ry for the remo val of a ca nce rous
les ion in her left breast. A s a preca uti onary measure,
her phys ic ian. Dr. Klin e, ad vised th at she undergo
radi ati on th erapy to preve nt furth er spread of th e
cance r. Mrs. N atanson conse nt ed to such treatm ent ,
but as a resul t of it , suffered seve re burns. Subsequ entl y, Mr s. Nata nson brought an action aga inst
her phys ici an o n th e th eory th at th e conse nt to
trea tment was not in fo rmed. Th e Supreme Court
of Ka nsas held th at Dr. Kline was und er the affirmati ve duty to m ake reason able discl osure to Mrs.
Na ta nso n, all owin g her to m ake an intellige nt decisio n wheth er o r n ot to take cobalt treatment. This
dut y in cluded di sc los ing th e ri sk inherent in the
proposed course of trea tment, bu t was limited to
th e di sc losu re onl y of fact s necessa ry to form th e
b as is of an int ellige nt consent.
In defin in g thi s bas is, the court held th at the
degree of di scl os ure is to be measured by the standard of wh at a reaso nabl e medica l practitio ner would
disclose to hi s pati ent und er th e sa me or simil ar circ um stanc es. Thus, th e patie nt must introduce expert
medi cal testimony in o rd er to establish th e communit y stand ard as to di sclos ure. Once such testim ony
is p roduced, it beco mes a jury qu esti on as to whether
th e defe nd ant/ phys ic ia n fa ll s sho rt of this stand ard .
Ac kn owledging th e li ab ilit y of a phys ician to
hi s pati ent fo r failur e to prov ide suffici ent inform ati on necessa ry fo r an info rm ed co nse nt , the question
arises as to what type of action is to be ma in tained
by th e pati ent. Th e court s th em selves are som ewh at
confused in thi s rega rd bu t ge nerall y th e- action is
b ro ught o n one of two th eories : th at of assa ult 1 or
th at of neglige nce . It is impo rtant to und erstand
th e d ifference betwee n an actio n fo r assa ult and an
actio n for neg li ge nce. In th e fo rmer, th e esse nce
of th e acti o n being th e un auth ori zed touching of th e
pati ent 's body, th e conse nt given, if th ere is any,
I T he te rm tec hnica ll y sho uld be .. ba tte ry .. w hic h is a n
unau th or ized to uching o f a no the r·s pe rson : ho wever, the
co urt s have no t bee n co nsiste nt in the use of thi s term ,
freq ue ntl y using .. assa ult .. in pl ace of it. The word .. assa ult ..
is used ge ne rica ll y to in clud e both .
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must be a complete nullity du e to so me mi srepresentation or omission by th e physician. On the other
hand , negligence connotes th e breac h of some dut y
or stand ard of care imposed upon th e physician. An
example of an actio n for assault or un autho ri zed operation is th e case of Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital (5) , in which th e patient was sufferin g
from a urin ary problem a nd , after consult atio n with
the attending physician, conse nt ed to a tran sureth e ral
prosta tic resec tion . The physician, howeve r, fa iled to
inform th e patient that in doing the o perati on th e
spermatic cords would be cut a nd th at the opera tio n
would rende r him ste ril e. Th e court held th at th e
failure of th e physici an to di sclose thi s essenti al
fact rend ered th e plaintiff's consent inv alid and
hence, supported an action for assa ult. One of th e
key fac tors in a n action based o n assault is th a t lac k
of sk ill in perform a nce of th e o pera ti on o r procedure
is of no concern . The o pe ratio n or trea tm ent may
have been performed in th e most sk illful manne r
but if th ere was no consent-informed consent-the
plaintiff is entitled to recove r damages from th e
physician. No expert testimony is needed in such
a case.
A case closer to ho me is th a t of W oodson v.
Huey ( 6), where prior to a n operatio n th e patient
informed hi s physician th at unde r no circumstances
did he want a spinal anesthetic admini stered to him
and was assured by th e phys ician th at he would
receive a general a nesth etic. The pa ti ent's wi sh was
entered in his reco rd by the physic ian . However , the
anesthetist admini ste red a spinal anesthetic following
which th e patient suffered paralys is. The court held
the anesthetist liable for assault but not the surgeon.
The fact th at the spinal was given in a perfectly
proper manner was of no consequence in an ac tion
for assault (7).
A negligence action , on th e o th er hand , requires
the pl aintiff to show that (a) the ri sk was recognizable and the physician's duty of care required
the di sclosure of th at ri sk; (b) had the patient
known of th e ri sk, he would not have consented ;
and ( c) no justifica tion ex isted for the physicia n's
failure to di sclose the risk ( 8). Th e plaintiff mu st
prove the fir st element by ex pert testimony establishing th e community stand ard a nd showing th at th e
physician's ac tion s fell short of th a t sta nd ard . Th e
second element necessa rily involves the subj ecti ve
intent of th e patient and can be established by his
simply testifying th at had he known of th e ri sk,
he would not have agreed . The third element comes
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into pl ay only if the pl aintiff can establish the first
and even th en would require expert testimony to
estab lish th e requirement of di sclosure. ( A few
courts have placed th e burden of proving this third
ele ment on th e ph ys ician rath er th an on the patient,
the effect of which is to create a jury issue in such
cases.)
If th ese three elements are shown by the plaintiff, he has made out a prim a facie case, and the
defend a nt mu st counter by showing th at he in fact
did make adequ ate discl os ure or th at under the
accepted sta nd ards, disclosure was not required .
Although a few courts still treat informed conse nt cases as an action for assa ult , the great majority
of jurisdiction s are getting away from this theory and
are trea ting such as action s sounding in negligence;
thus putting th em in th e sa me category as an
action for mi strea tm ent (9). Thus, in the case where
th e co mmunity stand ard is to secure consent to the
ad ministration of a spin al anesth etic during childbirth, it may be malpractice, th at is, an action for
negli gence, where such consent is not procured prior
to th e ac tu al givin g of the spinal anesth etic (IO).
Ex actly what th e courts require to make conse nt effectu al is at the prese nt time in a state of
confusion . Th e Arizona Supreme Court has set down
a good rul e in defi ning consent :
Consen t
is effectual if the co nsentor understands substant ia ll y the na ture of the surgica l procedure attempted a nd the probable results of the
ope ratio n. Thi s, as a matter of law, constitutes an
inform ed conse nt.
Given a n informed consent, liability if any must be predicated in malpractice ( I I ) .

Coupled with th e foregoing rule is th e corollary
bein g adopted by mo re and more courts that the
primary duty of a physician is to do wh at is best
for his patient , and th at a physician may withhold
disclosure of inform ation regarding any risks or complications of th e operation or treatment where a full
disclosure would be detrimental to the patient's
total care and best interest ( 12) . Thus, when in the
physici an's profession al opinion, informing the patient of certain of the risks or complications would
make th e patient unduly apprehensive and increase
the ri sk of complications during surgery, inform ati on may be withheld . However, let me emph as ize
th e importa nce of making a notatio n of such action
on th e patient's chart and , if appropriate, informing
the patient as soon as possible after the surgery has
been completed.

RUSSELL: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANESTHESIA MALPRACTICE

110

Wh at th en, as a nesth esio logists, sho ul d you do ,
and tell yo ur pa tie nt s prior to th e admini stra ti o n of
anest hes ia? Unfor tun a tely, th ere is no ha rd and fast
rul e which ca n be sta ted as to th e circum stances
un de r which yo u ca n withh old mak in g a full disclos ure and as to the kind of info rm ation whi ch ca n
be wi thh eld . Eac h case must of necess ity depe nd o n
its ow n pa rticul ar fac ts.
H owever, th ere are so me bas ic guid es th at
sho ul d be kept in min d:
I. Exa min e th e pa ti ent pri o r to administerin g
a nes th es ia. prefe rab ly the ni ght before and
this sho ul d be mo re th a n a cu rsory exam inat io n. Make a no tat io n in th e cha rt of th e
date and ti me of your exa min atio n, th e fi ndin gs. and any appropri ate o rde rs. An y do ubt
as to th e pati ent 's co nditi o n sho uld be cla rifie d beca use yo u will be held respo nsibl e fo r
what co uld have bee n d iscovered by a
pro per phys ica l exa m inat io n. In th e case of
Butler v. Layton. ( 13) neglige nce was fou nd
in th e admini strat io n of eth er to a pa tient
suffering fr om a bad co ld when th e pat ient
develo ped ac ut e bro nchiti s whi ch was ca used
by th e a nes th etic. H oweve r, whe re ev idence
is produ ced by th e ph ys icia n th at a pro per
ph ysica l exa min ati o n was give n to the patient pr io r to admini steri ng the anes th et ic ,
li abilit y on this gro un d is usua ll y avo id ed
( 14 ).

2. Ex pl a in ge ne rall y th e type of anest hetic to
be admini stered, what will hap pe n. and th at
there are ri sks a nd co mpli ca ti o ns atte nd ant
to any medica l proced ure . Depe nding upo n
th e pat ient's conditi o n and emotio nal stab ilit y, ma ke your dec isio n as to ho w fu ll a
di sc los ure sho uld be made. A fa irl y detailed
ex pl anati o n of what will take place m ay be
of in va lu abl e help si nce fea r of th e unkn ow n
is a lways mu ch wo rse than fear o f th e
know n.
3. H ave th e conse nt fo rm exec uted b y th e
patie nt with any restricti o ns im posed by th e
pa ti ent noted th ereon. If th ere are any re~tri cti ons th ese sho uld also be noted in th e
chart. In cide nt all y, if there is any subsequent cha nge as to any limit ati o ns o n th e
prev io usly give n co nse nt , thi s sho uld be
th oro ughly and compl etely doc um ented in
the cha rt.

Contract Liability. As a n adjunct to informed
conse nt, let me give you a wo rd o f ca uti on with
res pec t to th e ass ura nces given to a pati ent. Co urts
have bee n seve re in judging ph ys ic ians who mi slead ,
in ad ve rte ntl y o r oth erwise, the ir pati ent s in rega rd
to th e po tenti al se ri ousness o r re lati ve sim plic it y of
a proposed p rocedure o r o pe rati o n. Thu s, the physic ian who ma kes such statements as, " N o danger
ca n res ult " or " It 's a perfectl y sa fe trea tm ent ,"
may be held li able eve n th o ugh th e o perati on
he pe rfo rm s is done with all du e care and compete ncy. Illu strati ve of thi s is a rece nt case fr om
M ic hi ga n ( 15), dec ided in 197 1, in which the
pl a intiff was suffe ring fro m a peptic ulcer a nd co ntac ted th e defend a nt ph ys ic ia ns rega rdin g a poss ible
ope rati on. The pa ti ent was neve r told th at he m ust
have th e ope rati o n, but th e gist of what th e defe nd ant
ph ys ic ia ns told him is the foll ow ing:
O nce you have an ope ra tion it take s ca re o f a ll
yo ur tro ubles. Y ou ca n eat as you wa nt to. you
ca n drink as yo u wa nt to. yo u ca n go as you

plea se.

Dr . [XI a nd I are spec ia li sts. the re is

nothin g to it at all - it 's a very si mple operation.

Y o u'II be o ut o f wo rk three to fo u r wee ks at the
most. T he re is no da nge r a t a ll in thi s o pe ra ti o n.
Afte r the o peratio n yo u ca n th row away yo ur pill
box. In twen t y years if yo u fig ure ou t w hat you
spe nt fo r Maa lox pill s a nd d oc to r ca ll s. you could
buy a n awfu l lo t. W eigh it agai nst a n o perati o n.

Th e co urt held th at such words a mo unted to an
offer of a contrac t to achi eve by the o peration the
co nditi on desc ribed ; th at in reli ance o n the desc ription . the pl a intiff acce pted the o ffer ; a nd th at whe n
these res ults in fact we re not ac hieved . the contract
cond iti o n desc ribed was breached. A substa nti al jury
verdi ct fo r the pl a intiff based o n breac h of contrac t
was affi rm ed .
Th e majo rity o p ini on held th at the questi on
o f wheth e r a co ntrac t ex ists is a questi on of fact
fo r a jury in eve ry insta nce. Obvio usly, if J hi s dec isio n we re to be fo ll owed by oth er co urts, the effect
co uld be d isastrous beca use it wo uld seve rely limit
phys ic ia ns in the ir effort s to assure pati ent s and
ca lm the ir norm al fea rs. There was a ve ry stro ng and
well -reasoned di sse nt , and I wo uld ho pe and expect
th at the attitude o f the m ajo rity o f the courts would
not ex tend thi s holding to the norm al p ractice of
e nc o uraging the pati ent with reasonabl e assurances
which altho ugh th ey may at times be so mewh at
exagge rated , a re made with a the rapeutic intent.
Captain-of-the-Ship or Respondeat Superior.
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This now brings us to our next area of discussion .
It involves a straight malpractice case with special
emphasis on the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine or
respondeat superior. The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine is based upon the lo ng-acce pted premise th at
the surgeon is in charge of all that takes place in the
operating room and is, th erefore , lia ble for it all.
Respondeat superior simply means let the master
respond for anything that his servants or employees
may do.
By way of illustration , let me refer to a case that
occurred in California which clearly illustrates the
broad umbrella of responsibility th at is frequently
applied. The anesthesia was being administered by
a first-year resident who was under the immediate
supervision of an anesthesiologist who was responsible for supervising other operations at the same
time. The anesthesiologist was a sala ried member of
a private group of anesthesiologists, which group
through its chief was responsible for the anesthesiology training program. The residency program was
under the joint sponsorship of the local hospital, the
county hospital, and the state university. The chief
of the anesthesiology group was out of the country
at the time the incident occurred, but was ultimately
responsible for the progra m and all that went on
in connection with it . When suit was filed , the
defendants included the resident, the supervising
anesthesiologist, another anesthesiologist who came
to their assistance, the chief of the group, the group
itself, the local hospital, the county hospital, the state
university, and the surgeons performing the operation. The case was ultim ately settled prior to trial
with all parties contributing with the exception of
the surgeons. Anoxia and cardiac arrest developed
during surgery apparently due to several factors,
all of which were the responsibility of those administering the anesthesia. Recognizing the distinct
areas of separate responsibility which is gaining
wider acceptance by the courts, the surgeons did
not contribute to the ultimate settlement of the case.
The right to control is the basis for liability in situations of this type , and it can be traced from the
resident all the way through the various people or
organizations participating in the training program.
In spite of the broad implications of the Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, the courts pretty uniformly
recognize the expertise of anesthesiologists and except in very unusual situations, do not impose liability upon surgeons for anesthesia malpractice nor
upon anesthesiologists for surgical malpractice.
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When the anesthesia is being administered by
an anesthetist, we find less uniformity in the decisions and a greater willingness on the part of some
courts to impose liability upon the surgeon for the
negligent admini stration of the anesthetic . There are
two cases in point. One, Jackson v. Joyner (16), is a
North Carolina case in which a nurse who was an
employee of the hospital negligently administered the
a ne sthetic. The court held that while the operation
was in progress, the surgeon had full power and
control over all assisting nurses and that hence, the
nurse administering the anesthetic stood in the position of a borrowed servant to the surgeon for the
purpose and duration of the operation . In the case
of McKenney v. Tromly (17) the court held that it
was an admitted fact that the surgeon had the abso1ute ri ght of co ntrol of all personnel in the operating
room during th e operation and hence, was liable for
th e negligence of any of these persons. These cases
represent the extreme position and find their origin
in the ready willingness of surgeons to testify that
they are in absolute control of all that goes on in the
operating room during the performance of the operation . This certainly is no longer true, and they are
doi ng th emselves a disservice by failing to recognize
th e di stinct are as of responsibility th at exist in present
day medicine.
Certified Regi stered Nur se Anesthetists
(CRNA) are highly trained specialists with more
training and experience in the field of anesthesiology
th an the vast majority of th e surgeons. Thus, even
in si tu ations where CRNAs have administered the
anesth etic, courts are recognizing their expertise and
the separateness of their function. They follow the
principle th at where several doctors or nurses have
di stinct and separate parts to take which require
the undivided attention of each, only the one who
failed to use due care in the performance of the part
assigned to him should be held responsible. This is
tru e unless it can be shown th at one exercises or has
the right to control the other (18).
In Virginia, the question of whether a hospitalemployed nurse/ anesth etist is an agent of the operating physician or the hospital is a question of fact to
be determined by the jury and the main test, as in
all agency situations, is who has the right to control
(19).
As you can see, all of the illustrations that have
been given were not necessarily anesthesia cases.
However, the legal principles involved would apply
equally to you as anesthesiologists, and they do illus-
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tratc some of th e more tro ubl eso me areas from a
med ical legal poin t of view.
J hope you will all beco me kee nl y aware of
th e problem of info rm ed co nse nt, and when you return to yo ur respec ti ve hos pitals, chec k and see
what type co nse nt fo rm s are now being used; see
th at they are upd ated, and do as so me groups of
anesthesiologists are doing and use yo ur ow n consent fo rm. Litigati on in th e area of in fo rm ed consent
has onl y bee n go ing on fo r appro xim ately 20 yea rs,
and each yea r there has bee n an increase in th e number of suits fil ed in volving this problem. A good
conse nt fo rm and an app ropri ate di sc uss ion between
anesthesiologist and pati ent wo uld go a long way in
red uc ing the amount of litigati on on thi s point.
With res pect to respond ea t superi or and vicarious li ability. it is di ffi cult to predict how the courts
will treat this in th e future. Howeve r, I am certain
th ere will be more and more judicial recogniti on of
th e ··a rea of expertise" principle. thu s limiting li ability to those ac tu all y performin g a spec ific task.
At th e sa me tim e, yo u should not ove rl oo k the fac t
th at one negli ge nt ac t by a first-yea r resident ca n
start a domin o th eo ry of li ab ility, and this is particul arl y tru e in th e teac hin g instituti ons. In such
situati ons. th ere is no substitut e fo r acti ve and cl ose r
supervision by th e teac hin g staff .
Finall y, let me remind yo u th at it is an integ ral
part of your responsibilit y to kee p yo ur pati ents
ass ured and th eir fea rs to a minimum. Howeve r,
don't let yo ur ex uberance and self-co nfidence ge t th e
best of yo u to th e point th at you find yo urself as the
defe nd ant in a breac h of co ntract ac ti on as did th e
ph ys icians in th e Michi ga n case referred to.
T hank you fo r yo ur kind attenti on and I trust
th at yo u can continu e to avo id th e legal pit fa ll s some
of my colleagues are co nstantl y putting in yo ur paths.
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